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DIPLOMAS, DEGREES, AND DISCRIMINATION
Dipolmas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandanted the commonsense proposition that they are not to become
masters of reality.1
One of the most observable traits in the current labor market is
the increasing reliance of employers on educational credentials as employment criteria.' Education, long esteemed for values other than its
marketability,3 has in large part been transformed into an employment
preparation process. The O'Toole Commission, which investigated aspects of American employment, found that, "although the value of a
college education is not solely measurable in terms of its usefulness in
the marketplace, the dominant interest, constantly reinforced in America, is in its marketability." 4
The practice of imposing educational requirements as employment
criteria,, referred to as "credentialism" by economists and educators, 5
affects different groups in the society in different ways. As observed
by one commentator:
Given the way our educational system functions, the widespread practice of requiring a credential as a necessary condition
for job consideration is one that is bound to have an adverse impact on employment for members of [the] group of last entry. In
the United States in 1970, 82 percent of the relevant age group
was completing twelfth grade. The remaining 18 percent included
a disproportionate number of Blacks, Indians, and Spanish-surnamed Americans, who likewise are represented in the lower socioeconomic class in disproportionate numbers.6
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1971).
2. U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, REPORT ON HIGHER EDUCATION 39 (1971):
"From the studies we have seen and the interviews we have had with employers, we believe that educational credentials are not only increasingly required for jobs, but that
the requirements themselves are rising."
3. See Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in 4 WoRKs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 60-65
(federal ed. 1904); Keniston & Gerzon, Human and Social Benefits, in UNxvERsAL
HIGHER EDUCATION: CosTs, BENEFiTS & OPTIoNs 49 (1972).
4.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 111
[hereinafter cited as WORK IN AMERICA].
5. HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LABOR Mm= 9-12 (M. Gordon ed. 1974); see

(1973)

Huff, Credentialing by Tests or by Degrees: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 44 HARv. ED. REV. 246 (1974) [hereinafter cited as

Huff].
6.

Huff, supra note 5, at 250.
[1377]
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Although widespread education has been a persistent and cherished goal of American society, the foregoing observations suggest that
the emphasis placed on educational attainment vis-h-vis employment
has caused, and may continue to cause, harmful social consequences.
Many groups which have, for a variety of reasons, historically been disadvantaged in American society have also, for substantially the same
reasons, failed to achieve educational parity with the white majority.
In an era in which continuing efforts are being made to remove irrational obstacles to the social and economic advancement of minority
groups, unfettered utilization of educational credentials as a job criterion continues to impede such progress. The impediment, however, is
neither necessary nor inevitable, for legal remedies are available to
remove it.
This note will examine credentialism in the American labor market and discuss the mechanisms available to curtail its prevalence as
an employment practice. The first portion of the article will discuss
the adverse effects of credentialism on potential employees, the labor
market, and the educational process itself. The second portion will
analyze one of the major available remedial tools: Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 7
The Adverse Effects of Credentialism
Discrimination Against Minorities
The most critical aspect of credentialism is its discriminatory impact on minorities." The statistics reflecting unequal educational attainment of minorities and nonminorities are familiar to those involved
in education.9 Although the figures indicate that minorities have in7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
8. Although the focus of this article is race discrimination, much of the discriminatory impact of credentials falls upon women and senior workers. For women,
this is especially true for occupations requiring specialized degrees in engineering or
business. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvISORS 101 (1973). Likewise, since previous generations typically placed much less importance on education credentials than contemporary employers, credential requirements effectively discriminate
against the older worker. C. JENCKS, M. SMTrrH, H. ACKLAND, M. BANE, D. COHEN, H.
GINTIS, B. HEYNS, S. MICHELSON, INEQUALITY 63 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JENCKS].
9. "The percentages of workers in March 1973 by race, age, and education were
as follows:
High School,
Negro and
4 years or more
other races
White
18 to 24 years old ...
..........
.
60.8
81.5
25 years old and over ..
.........
.
50.6
70.0
College,
1 year or more
18 to 24 years old ...
..........
.
23.3
32.8
25 years old and over ..
.........
.
18.9
30.1"
Deuterman, Educational Attainment of Workers, March, 1973, 97 Mo. LAB. Rnv. 58,
60 (1974).
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creased their absolute educational achievement over time, the disparity

relative to whites has nonetheless made marginal increases. 10

Abso-

lute educational advances are not helpful to minorities if their relative
disadvantage remains unchanged. In a society continually raising its
educational demands commensurately with increases in average educational levels, those at the front of the educational completion ranks are
those first hired by employers seeking credentialed individuals.:"

In addition to thus effectively discriminating against many minority groups, an educational requirement for employment also fails ef-2
fectively to distinguish among differing levels of individual ability.'

Employers fail to recognize diversity in educational achievement as
long as the "paper proof" of the experience is the same. It is clear
that some children who finish high school, but do not enter college,

would continue their education but for their parents' inability to finance
further schooling.' 3 Other high school graduates can barely read but
are passed through a school system which, aware of its own failings,
awards degrees almost without regard to individual capabilities.'"

Thus the highly capable and the marginally capable individual may
compete equally for jobs which require a high school diploma, while
neither can apply for jobs which require a college degree. Such indis-

criminate leveling of individuals is not only personally debilitating, but
also socially inefficient.
Distortion of the Educational Process
The emphasis on employment as the ticket to a job also contributes to a distorted view of the value of education and the role of educational institutions in our society. Many students feel compelled to stay
in school merely because the diploma or degree awarded for satisfac10. S. MILLER, & P. RoBy, THE FuTuRE oF INEQUALITY 126 (1970). As demonstrated by these authors, minorities increase their educational attainment to the high
school level while whites continue to forge ahead at the college level.
11. Huff, supra note 5, at 250.
12. "Credentialism obscures the immense variation in the learning that is represented by diplomas. The superior student and the borderline student, and the graduates
of superior institutions and of mediocre institutions, are all lumped together as 'educated,' whereas dropouts or pushouts who may possess comparable knowledge and skills
are seriously discriminated against." Marien, Beyond Credentialism: The Future of Social Selection, 2 SoCIAL POLICY 15 (Sept.-Oct. 1971).
13. This phenomenon is clearly reflected in studies indicating- that education is
highly correlated with parental income. See Michelson, The Further Rlsponsibility of
Intellectuals,43 HAnv. ED.REV. 92 (1973); JENCKS, supra note 8, at 21-22, 141.
14. This problem has become so acute that the University of California faculty
has recommended reading exams be given to entering undergraduates. Resolutions of
the 1975 Faculty Conference: Entering Undergraduates, Report to President Hitch,
University of California.
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tory attendance is so valuable in the labor market. 15 The unique value
of educational credentials to virtually every attractive career means that
both those who will and those who will not eventually fill those scarce
employment positions must complete the formal schooling to stay in the
running. 16 With so many young people pursuing so few "high status"
jobs, failure is inevitable for a vast number. The declining rate of return on education, concludes the Coleman Report, "will lead to a new
problem, a problem with which the United States has had little experience, the existence of a relatively large group of highly educated but
underemployed and disappointed young people."'
Similarly, as educational institutions distribute credentials which
they realize are highly prized by students and employers in job allocation, the process of awarding those degrees necessarily affects the educational system.'
The extent of the impact is not yet clear, but writers
familiar with the problem have described its contours.
Existing labor market pressures and projections (particularly as
they relate to occupational needs and skill requirements) operate
on those who "run" the university-the faculty and administration.
These pressures affect course and curricular requirements and the
allocation of resources to competing programs. 19
Other commentators claim that the effect on education is even more
pervasive: "the market value of education has driven out its other val20
ues."
Credentialism has created other problems for education, as well.
Since many students know they must complete schooling to compete suc15.

See B. STRUMPEL, HIGHER EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC

AND WHAT ELSE?

55 (1971);

BEHAVIOR,

CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION,

A DEGREE
LEss TIME,

MORE OPTIONS 7 (1971).
16. Id. See also U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR BULL. No.
1785, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK].

17.

PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMM., YOUTH:

TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD

75 (1973).
18. "Even now there is some concern about overemphasis on academic certifica.
tion and prolonged periods of study in higher education. If these fears are justified, then
it must be true that employers, by using degrees as proxies for other desirable traits in
prospective employees, have to some extent changed the emphasis in colleges and universities from learning to degree granting. Such an impact can occur without the active
cooperation of the institutions themselves. The enrollment of large numbers of students
who primarily seek a degree so that they can enhance their job prospects is sufficient
to place great strain on traditional education programs, especially those that are not
geared to prepare students for short-run professional goals." Fogel & Mitchell, Higher
Education Decision Making and the Labor Market, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LABOR MARKET 498 (M. Gordon ed. 1974).
19. Kaun, The College Dropout and Occupational Choice, in HIGHER EDUCATION
AND THE LABOR MARKET 148 (M. Gorden ed. 1974).
20. WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 108.
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cessfully in the employment market, they take courses required by the
college or high school for the credential but not relevant to their eventual career choices. In order to attain the desired academic degree,
these students must enroll in certain courses solely to fulfill the credential requirements. The resulting attitudes produce little advantage for
either the student, the class, or the school. Addressing this problem,
Shiela Huff has predicted that a narrowing of the job orientation currently associated with education would result in positive benefits:
"The educational system might continue to grow, not because of increasing degree requirements2 1 for jobs, but because people were interested in the courses offered."
The deleterious impact of credentialism on individuals and educational systems is hardly counterbalanced by the dubious benefits to the
labor market. Although employers currently rely heavily on credentials in hiring and promotion decisions, few have a clear rationale for
so operating.2 2 A recently developed and growing body of literature
suggests that few positive economic returns accrue from the practice
of hiring workers with more education; in fact, credentialism may actually impede rather than promote an efficient labor market. 23 Since
a given level of education does not necessarily represent similar educational achievements, and since individuals intellectually capable of further education do not have similar economic resources, hiring decisions
made on the basis of credentials are incapable of distinguishing the intelligent from the persistent, or the wealth-advantaged from the mentally gifted.
Alienation of Employees

Once hired, workers often display various forms of alienation, at
least some of which are associated with the credentialing process responsible for their having been chosen for the job. 24 The failure to
garner a desired position after several years of study may result in in21. Huff, supra note 5, at 25.
22. "Personnel and manpower decisions are made, to be sure, but the histories of
such decisions are little more than hazy and unsubstantiated recollections of the 'itseemed-like-a-good-idea' variety." I. BERG, EnucATIoN AND IoBs: Trm GREAT TRAININO ROBBERY 73 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BERG].
23. "IFor a large number of jobs, education and job performance appear to be
inversely related. The less educated tend to remain with an employer longer and be
more productive than those workers with ten or more years of education. The more
highly educated workers become bored with unchallenging work and express their dissatisfaction in lower productivity and higher turnover rates." WoRK IN AMEUCA, supra
note 4, at 135; see BERG, supra note 22, at 65; Faia, On College Graduation and Occupational Performance: The Mythology of Certification, 47 COLLEGE & UNr
rrY 70,
73 (Fall 1971). See text accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
24. Ullman & Gutteridge, Job Search in the Labor Market for College Graduates:
A Case Study of MBAs, 17 AcADynM OF MANAGEMENT J. 381, 382 (1974).
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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

efficient on-the-job behavior, chronic absenteeism, and numerous job

changes in search of a lost dream.26 For workers who feel their employment situation is beneath their educational achievements, the
work place may be a focus of frustrated expectations.
The overall impact of these effects taken together presents even

more troubling social implications.

If, as the evidence strongly indi-

cates, educational attainment confers occupational status and personal
7

income,2 6 which in turn confers educational benefits upon offspring,

the cycle of poverty and privilege is legitimized and reinforced by credentialism. The consequent social stratification dims the chances for
mobility that is the essence of modern America. Thus, an essentially
artificial process dooms the children of the havenots to have little
more.

A Legal Approach to Credentialism
One method of mitigating the adverse effects of equating educational achievement with work performance capability is to curtail or
prohibit the use of educational credentials as employment criteria.
Legislation dealing specifically with the often counterproductive rela-

tionship between education and labor by compelling employers to rationalize completely their hiring procedures does not yet exist.

Never-

29
theless, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871,28 recently exhumed,

and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with important amendments broadening its coverage added in 1972, 9 could bring considerable pressure to bear on employers whose credential criteria have a discriminatory impact and are not valid predicators of job performance.
The substantial body of law that has developed under the analogous
25. BERG, supra note 22, at 66; WoK IN AMERrCA,
PATIONAL OuTLooK, supra note 16, at 20.
26. OCCUPATIONAL Oumroox, supra note 16, chart 11,

supra note 4, at 138; OcCU-

at 22.
27. "In 1968, it was twice as likely that a young person would attend college if
his family's annual income exceeded $15,000 than if the income were between $5,000
and $7,500." S. LEviTAN, G. MAGNUM & R. MARSHALL, HUMAN RESOURCES AND LABOR MARKETS 17 (1972); see JENCKs, supra note 8, at 19-20, 138; Michaelson, The Further Responsibility of Intellectuals, 43 HARv.ED. REv.64 (1973).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970).
29. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Jones was the first unequivocal Supreme Court decision holding that there is a private right of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1982. The decision has also been uniformly interpreted to revive the right
of private action under sections 1981 and 1983 as well. See, e.g., Boudreaux v. Baton
Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works of Internatl Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
911 (1970). See cases cited note 32 infra.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1970), as amended (Supp. 1I,1973).
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provisions of Title V1131 and sections 1981 and 198332 of the earlier
Civil Rights Acts indicates the illegality of credentialism. Yet the relative novelty of the legal principles involved in employment discrimina-

tion litigation has left many issues unresolved and others in a state of
confusion. The remainder of this article will delineate a legal approach
to the credentialism problem through consideration of the applicable
burdens of proof, the available defenses, and the appropriate remedies.
The Prima Facie Case
Although private individuals are not always required to practice

nondiscrimination, discriminatory practices affecting interstate commerce are appropriate subjects for federal legislative action.3 3 Title
VII, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is such an enactment, limit-

ing judicial intrusion into private hiring decisions to those practices
which have a discriminatory impact." The first step in Title VII litiga31. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Duhon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 494 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., No.
73-45 CIV-P (N.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 1974), reprinted in 8 CCII ENT. PRAc. DEc. 9695,
at 5901 (1974); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., No. CIV-72-445 (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 27, 1973), reprinted in 7 CCIH Emp. Prac. Dec. 6461 (1973); king v. New
York Civil Service Comm'n, No. 73 Civ. 4935 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1973), reprinted in
6 CCtI Emp. Prac. Dec. 6243 (1973); United States v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co.,
No. Civ. 70-91 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 1973), reprinted in 6 CCII Emp. Prac. Dec. 5920
(1973); United States v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, Local 24, 364 F. Supp. 808
(D.N.J. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers, Local 10, No. 19693-4 (W.D. Mo. June
15, 1973), reprinted in 6 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 59 (1973); Roman v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 368 F. Supp. 47 (S.D. Tex. 1973); United States v. Bricklayers, Local 1,
No. C-71-65 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 1973), reprinted in 5 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
863 (1973); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., Civil Nos. 11,598, 13,452 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 3, 1972), reprinted in 4 CCH Emp. Prac. Dec. 5899 (1972); Sims v. Sheetmetal Workers, Local 65, 353 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in relevant part, 489
F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., No. 638-70-R
(E.D. Va. Sept. 2, 1971), reprintedin 4 CCtI Emp. Prac. Dec. 5009 (1971).
32. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, No. 4-70-Civ. 399 (D. Minn. Mar. 9, 1971),
reprinted in 3 CCIH Emp. Prac. Dec. 6665 (1971), affd in relevant part, 452 F.2d 315
(8th Cir.), modified, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
See also Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974).
33. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
34. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-() to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or (2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended
(Supp. 1II, 1973). "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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tion is thus the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination
by demonstrating that use of a particular hiring criterion has a discriminatory impact. When the alleged discriminatory impact results from
use of an educational credential as an employment prerequisite, establishment of a prima facie case under Title VII is an unusually simple
task.
The elements necessary for a prima facie case under Title VII
were enumerated in the landmark Supreme Court case of Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. 5 The Duke Power Company had required a high
school diploma for hiring in any of its departments, except the labor
department, and for transfer from its coal handling department to any
inside division (operations, maintenance, or laboratory). Until 1965,
blacks were prohibited from employment in any except the labor department. In 1966, the year in which Title VII became effective, the
company added a further requirement for new employees: in addition
to possessing a high school degree, an applicant for any position other
than one in the labor department was required to score satisfactorily
on two aptitude tests.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned in part that because "the Company
initiated the policy with no intent to discriminate . . .6 there was no
violation of the act. In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, a unanimous Supreme Court37 reversed, holding that proof of a discriminatory
purpose was not a necessary element in establishing a prima facie case:
We do not suggest that either the District Court or the Court
of Appeals erred in examing the employer's intent; but good intent
or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job ca38
pability.
In focusing on the effect rather than the purpose of the particular practice, the Court emphaized that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act
to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."3 9 Thus, after Griggs, the plaintiff's burden is only to show that
"'X' intended to engage in the practice that has a discriminatory impact,
40
not that 'X' intended to discriminate.1
35.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).

36.

420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970).

37.
38.

401 U.S. 424 (1971)
Id. at 432.

(Brennan, J., not participating).

39. Id.
40. William H. Brown (former EEOC chairman), The Changing Concept of Discrimination, CONTACT 33 (July 1972), cited in Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F.
Supp. 87, 95 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edi-

son Co., Nos. 74-1007 to -1009, -1675 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 1975), reprinted in 9 CCH
EMP. PRAc. DEC.

9997, at 7149 (1975).
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Establishingthe DiscriminatoryImpact

The next question, of course, is how the discriminatory impact is
to be established. Courts generally, including the Supreme Court in
Griggs, have tended to rely on census statistics which demonstrate that

minorities have a lower propensity than nonminorities for attaining specific educational levels. 4 1 Griggs itself struck down educational requirements on the basis of 1960 census data which indicated that 34
percent of white males graduated from high school in North Carolina,

compared to only 12 percent of black males.4

The use of census data in conjunction with the "head-winds" con-

cept is extremely significant for two reasons. First, a plaintiff need
not demonstrate that the requirement of an educational credential will
exclude all minorities, or that all nonminorities will be favored. The
screening effect of the educational requirement in the Griggs decision

eliminated 66 percent of the white males and 88 percent of the black
males. Although both races were thus affected by use of the criterion,
the essence of the proof offered in the form of census data was that

the impact on blacks was at a rate 22 percent greater than on whites.
Second, the Griggs holding established that the measurement of

discriminatory impact is to be taken outside the context of the plant
where the discrimination allegedly occurs.43 When impact is measured
outside the plant, the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of demonstrating that the racial composition of the plant itself is not commensurate
with the racial composition of the community, and the defendant can-

not invoke the defense of approximate racial parity.44 In a Title VII
case asserting that a greater percentage of minorities than nonminori-

ties has been excluded by the employer's criteria, the comparison of

racial composition of the plant to racial composition of the surrounding
41. See, e.g., cases cited notes 31-32 supra.
42. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
43. There are two statistical methods available to the plaintiff's lawyer to demonstrate a discriminatory impact: (1) a disparity in the percentage of minorities within
the employers plant, compared to the minority representation in the community from
which the employer draws his personnel, and (2) a disparate percentage of minorities
excluded due to the employer's employment criteria. For an excellent analysis, see
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MrCH. L. REV. 59, 92 (1972).
44. See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974);
cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). If a plaintiff is able to
demonstrate that a greater percentage of minorities are excluded by the employer's employment criteria than nonminorities, the employer could only achieve approximate racial parity with the community by increasing the number of minority applicants, and
thereby increasing the number rejected. This obviously does nothing to remedy a discrimination defined as a situation whereby a greater percentage of minority as compared
to nonminority applicants are excluded by the employer's criteria.
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community is simply irrelevant. Thus, the Fifth Circuit, clearly the
most prolific and experienced court in Title VII liitgation,4 5 disallowed
a defense in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. that attempted
to demonstrate racial parity in the plant, stating,
Goodyear directs our attention to many statistics which it asserts
establish that it has transferred black employees from the labor department and hired blacks from the Houston area in a ratio equivalent to the total black population in the area. However, reliance
on such data misinterprets the significance of Johnson's proof
. . . . Such evidence does not disprove the essential finding that
the tests have a detrimental impact on black applicants. It merely
discloses that Goodyear has attempted by other practices to remove
the taint of the tests' consequences. The fact still remains that for
those potential black hirees and black labor department transferors,
these46 unvalidated testing devices have a substantial invidious effect.
The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit is not dissimilar from that of

the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.47

In that case,

despite the fact that the employer hired women for 75 to 80 percent
of the positions available, the court concluded that a hiring requirement
that women have no preschool age children, a criterion not applied to
men, was discriminatory on the basis of sex.4 ' When the criterion is
discriminatory, the number of minorities hired despite the criterion is
unimportant. Were an employer able to avoid liability by demonstrating that notwithstanding the discriminatory credential requirement he
hired minorities in a ratio commensurate with the minority ratio in the
community, the discriminatory impact would merely have been shifted
further down the line.4 9 At some point the use of the requirement
45. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.
1974); Duhon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 494 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). As observed by one
court, "While discrimination exists and has existed nationwide, because discrimination
has been more overt in the states of the Fifth Circuit that court has become very experienced in and sensitive to the subtle problems of racial discrimination." Mack v. General
Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 75 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
46. 491 F.2d 1364, 1372-73 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
48. Id. at 543-44.
49. This concept can be understood by envisioning an area containing 2,000 workers, composed of equal numbers of minorities and whites, with the high school credential
attainment equal to that of the national average (approximately 60% and 80% respectively). If eight plants exist in the area, each requiring a high school diploma for employment, and each hiring 200 persons, six of the plants can establish a minority population in parity with the population of the area. Plants seven and eight however, in
order to use the credential requirement, must hire greater numbers of whites than minorities. The discriminatory impact of the degree requirement has been passed down
the line to plants seven and eight. It would be anomalous to hold only plants seven
and eight liable for discriminating, since it is the credentialism process that has created
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will eliminate a disparate percentage of minorities from employment,
and the policy behind Title VII dictates that no company should be able
to contribute to that ultimate effect by the maintenance of the discriminatory educational criterion.
The employer in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.Y' attempted two other novel, but unsuccessful, defenses. First, Goodyear
attempted to limit the relevant age group for statistical purposes to sixteen to twenty-four year olds, presumably because the disparity in that
age group is less than in the overall population. The circuit court, rejecting this approach, pointed out that "[a] 'young' black individual,
whether age 25 or 45, is a potential employee in the Goodyear plant." 51
Second, Goodyear proposed the immediate Houston area as the geographic region in which the comparison of relative educational attainment was to be measured. The court chidingly responded,
Goodyear's geographic . . . limitations conveniently ignore
the recognized mobility of today's black labor force . . . . [A]
black individual of rural Texas today, may be an active participant
in the Houston labor pool tomorrow.52
The court concluded by rejecting an approach of "selective interpretation" of statistics:
Goodyear's limited and selective interpretation of the 'relevant'
statistics overlooks previous judicial precedent. In Griggs v. Duke
Power Company, the Supreme Court relied on statistics for the entire state of North Carolina. Even more compelling, in United
States v. Georgia Power Company, our court considered statistics
for the South as a whole and the immediate Atlanta area. The
utilization of these statistics implicitly recognizes the mobility of today's labor force . . ..
Courts are thus clearly cognizant of the potential manipulative abuse
of statistics. The utilization of a credential requirement, whenever it
can be shown that minorities have not achieved the requisite educational status in equal proportionto whites, will constitute a prima facie
case of discrimination under Title VII.
The Business Necessity Justification
Having demonstrated a discriminatory impact and thereby established a prima facie case, the plaintiff has satisfied his burden of
proof. Nevertheless, a hiring criterion with a discriminatory impact is
not illegal per se; the employer is entitled to attempt to show that the
the result. Cf. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. RFv. 235, 29697 (1971).
50. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
51. Id.at 1371.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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requirement is justified.5 4 The justifications available to the defendant
for the use of discriminatory criteria and their possible application in
the credentialism context are therefore the next area of concern in Title
VII litigation.
The Supreme Court decision in Griggs again supplies the relevant
legal principles. Three important points relevant to the defense of justification emerge from that decision. First, the burden of providing
the rationale rests with the defendant: "Congress has placed on the
employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have
a manifest relationship to the employment in question." 55 Second, as
is implicit in the passage just quoted, the screening requirement in
question must be related to the particular job for which it is used. As
the Supreme Court emphasized, "The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 15 6 Third, a mere hypothetical relationship to the job is not
sufficient to justify a discriminatory employment practice. The Court
discussed and approved as the legal requisite the EEOC Guidelines establishing standardized procedures for justifying discriminatory criteria:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting § 703(h) to
permit only the use of job-related tests. The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference. Since the Act and its legislative history support the Commission's construction, this affords good
57 reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.
The Need for Statistical Validation
The EEOC Guidelines clearly include educational criteria within
the definition of "tests."5 " In establishing validation procedures for
"tests," the Guidelines provide that
"[e]vidence of a test's validity should consist of empirical data
demonstrating that -the test is predictive of or significantly correlated
with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970); see 401 U.S. at 431; Pope, Practicing Equal
Employment Law on Behalf of an Employer: An Overview, 61 Ky. L.J. 879, 886
(1973).
55. 401 U.S. at 432.
56. Id. at 431.
57. Id. at 432 (citations omitted). Appellate court decisions following the
Griggs holding have relied on the EEOC Guidelines. E.g., Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 221 (1974) (citations omitted): "[W]e note that the company has at no time attempted to validate its tests under the EEOC Guidelines, which
we found mandatory inGeorgia Power."
58. "The term 'test' includes all. . . specific educational ... requirements ..
EEOC Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1974).
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relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.59
The available evidence, although admittedly not extensive, indicates that statistical validation of an educational credential according
to the EEOC Guidelines is highly unlikely. Professor Ivar Berg, in studies of both blue collar and white collar occupations and the relationship of job performance to educational credentials, discovered that credentials were seldom positively 60correlated to performance and were
sometimes even inversely related.
Existence of Alternative Hiring Procedures
Even if a defendant could produce satisfactory statistical validation, however, he would have only met one-half of his burden. The
Guidelines provide that in addition to showing a statistical relationship,
the employer must "demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are unavailable for his use."' 61 Shortly after the Griggs decision approved the EEOC Guidelines as legal standards, the Fourth Circuit in Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation set forth
the principles applicable to the defense of justification:
The challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomaccomplish it equally well
plish the business purpose advanced,6or
2
with a lesser differentialracialimpact.

The court emphasized that "a practice is hardly 'necessary' if an alterthe intended purpose or is equally efnative practice better effectuates
63
fective but less discriminatory."
59. Id. § 1607.4(c).
60. "In the first of the field investigations, data were collected in 1967 on the productivity, turnover, and absenteeism of 585 former and present female workers in a
multi-plant Mississippi textile manufacturing company. We found that educational
achievement was inversely related to performance thus conceived." BERG, supra note
22, at 87.
In a study of 4,000 "debit agents" employed by Prudential Insurance Company, Professor Berg found that "[tjhe records of high school graduates rarely differed by more
than a few percentage points from those of comparably numerous college graduates of
similar age operating in similar markets: sometimes the less educated men did better,
although a few did not do so well as their better-educated compeers." Id. at 93.
In another white collar study, Professor Berg found the results to be in line with
those already reported: "Performance in 125 branch offices of a major New York bank,
measured by turnover data and by the number of lost accounts per teller, was inversely
associated with the educational achievements of those 500 workers." Id.
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1974).
62. 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
63. Id. at 798 n.7; accord, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652,
662 (2d Cir. 1971) ("necessity connotes an irresistible demand").
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It seems obvious that for virtually any specific educational criterAn educational creion, more effective alternatives are available."
dential, as evidence of the applicant's ability to perform particular tasks,
is both too broad and too narrow a requirement. It is overbroad because many courses necessary to obtain the credential have no relevance to the job skills required. It is too narrow because it unduly limits an applicant's presentation of evidence that he possesses necessary
:skills.
Since "Congress has commanded . . . that any tests used must
measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract, '65
an employer must not require more of the person applying than is necessary for the job. For example, if algebra is needed for the job, a
test with 80 percent algebra and 20 percent calculus is overbroad for
that job. So, too, if the job requires a high degree of English reading
and writing proficiency, a test which includes sections for foreign language translation or composition is too broad. In several decisions
the Fifth Circuit has recognized that the requirement of a high school
diploma suffers from the defect of overbreadth, and has suggested the
use of tests more narrowly tailored to measure the actual job abilities
sought. In United States v. Georgia Power Co., the court declared that
"[miany high school courses needed for a diploma (history, literature,
physical education, etc.) are not necessary for these abilities. A new
reading and comprehension test . . . might legitimately be used for this
job need." 66 Moreover, in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
the court summarized this objection to education credentials by noting
that "[t]he high proficiency level established by this standard [high
school] not only precludes qualified employees but also is not refined
sufficiently to measure the ability sought by the company."6' 7 Thus,
whatever ability or skill an employer is seeking it seems that there will
always be a test more narrowly constructed and therefore more likely
actually to evaluate those skills than an educational credential.
64. "The catalogue of such alternatives is rapidly growing. The development of
several new paper and pencil tests which purport to measure traditional aptitudes in a
more culturally balanced way has been mentioned. Another possibility is the work sample approach to testing, under which a selected series of work tasks are substituted for
a paper and pencil test. This technique has long been a staple in the selection of typists
and stenographers and is now being expanded in demonstration studies to cover a wide
range of jobs." Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws:

A General Approach, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1668-69 (1969).
65. 401 U.S. at 436.
66. 474 F.2d 906, 918 (5th Cir. 1973), quoting United States v. Georgia Power
Co., No. 12355 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1971), reprinted in 3 CCH Emp. Prac. Dec. 7073,
at 7093 (1971); accord, Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245
(5th Cir. 1974).
67. 494 F.2d 211, 238 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Overbreadth is not the only infirmity inherent in credentialism. A
criterion which requires certain skills or knowledge that is admittedly
job related, but which accepts only certain types of evidence of that
skill or knowledge, is too narrow. It unfairly excludes from consideration those applicants who possess the qualifications but present the
wrong evidence thereof. Job-related skills and knowledge can certainly be acquired in school, but they obviously can be acquired elsewhere, as well. Although not articulated in terms of "narrowness," this
objection appears to have been recognized by the courts. In Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., the defendant claimed that the criterion used to select applicants was not really a high school diploma or
equivalent, but "rather a criterion used to select applicants who had
obtained a sufficient educational level to successfully complete the International Correspondence courses relating to the craft for which they
68 It argued that the high
were entering an apprenticeship ...
school diploma or equivalent was merely the acceptable evidence of
"sufficient educational level." The Fifth Circuit responded:
Here, we understand the company to mean that a certain reading
level and familiarity with study techniques is necessary to participate in -the course work of the apprentice program. This cannot
be equated with a requirement for a high school education or its
equivalent. This Court, in fact, affirmed a district court's condemnation of a similar rationale for a high school educational criterion
69
in Georgia Power .
In addition, the Supreme Court has observed that "[h]istory is filled
badges of accomplishment
with performance without the conventional 70
in terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees.
The equating of a credential with specific skill attributes clearly
excludes those with the abilities but without the educational attainment.
Alternative proof of actual ability can be readily conceived. If the required skill is blueprint reading, a degree in engineering may well evidence such ability. But the credential itself merely indicates where the
skill was obtained. A more specific test could easily demonstrate possession of the skill independent of where it was learned, i.e., in school
or through individual industry. In this context, it may be noted that
the armed forces utilize analogous screening devices to predict a person's performance in a number of capacities. Professor Berg found
that
[d]ata on the performance of military personel [sic] in technical
and other schools support the assertion that there are better predictors of the learning and "trainability" capabilities of personnel
than formal educational achievement. There is scarcely a single
68. Id. at 237.
69. Id.
70. 401 U.S. at 433.
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program in the Armed Forces for which discrete measures of aptitudes, weak as they may be, are not much
71 better predictors of performance than educational achievement.
In sum, the rationale for using educational credentials appears
weak. With alternatives available, an employer faces substantial difficulty in establishing that the discriminatory educational requirement is
in fact and in law a business necessity. Because credentials have the
inherent infirmity of being too broad and too narrow to serve as useful
tools for the evaluation of job related qualifications, their use as employment criteria should be severely circumscribed. Criteria that are less
broad can better predict ability to perform required tasks, without being obscured by often unrelated scholastic achievements; and criteria
that are not so narrow will permit demonstration of ability regardless
of whether the skill was obtained through formal schooling. The elimination of credentialism is entirely consistent with traditional American
notions; as one court has said, "Wed as we are to the Abe LincolnHoratio Alger tradition in this nation, such
a requirement except in ex72
ceptional cases would be hard to justify.
The Courts Uphold the Employer: A Critique
of the Contrary Cases
The courts have generally recognized the discriminatory impact of
the educational credential requirement. 73 Once the burden of justification has shifted to the defendant, however, some courts have had considerable difficulty applying 74
the standards set out in the EEOC guidelines and approved in Griggs.
Moreover, the difficulty of justifying the use of educational cre
dentials as employment criteria has not prevented employers from attempting to meet the burden, and they have sometimes prevailed in
the courts. Some courts have simply allowed employers to circumvent
the Supreme Court-approved EEOC validation procedures described
above. 75 Furthermore, no court allowing credentials to remain as a
barrier has addressed the fundamental question of alternatives and the
6
corollary arguments of overbreadth and overnarrowness.7
71. BERG, supranote 22, at 18.
72. United States v. Georgia Power Co., Nos. 11723, 12185, 14182 (N.D. Ga.
June 30, 1971), reprinted in 3 CCH Emp. Prac. Dec. 7092 (1971).
73. In Goodloe v. Martin Marietta Corp., No. C-2498 (D. Colo. Jan. 13, 1972),
reprinted in 7 CCH Emp. Prac. Dec. 6989 (1974), the court found a discriminatory im-

pact, but apparently did not realize it. "Admittedly, there are probably fewer blacks,
percentage wise, who can meet the educational tests than there are whites. But that
is the most that plaintiff has shown." Id. at 6991.

74.

See, e.g., 401 U.S. at 432.

75.

See text accompanying notes 57-59, 61 supra.

76.

See, e.g., Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972);
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The courts that have grappled with validity have mastered the
form, but not the substance necessary for proper analysis of the issue. Perhaps one should not view these early efforts too harshly,
since these courts confronted unfamiliar scientific and technical
problems. Nevertheless, cause for alarm exists when the courts
for more difficult techfumble the most basic issues of validation,
7
nical issues are waiting in the wings. 7
Castro v. Beecher

Two decisions, 78 both upholding use of an educational requirement, serve as particular examples of the pitfalls previously encountered and errors hopefully to be avoided in the future. Castro v.

Beecher,79 a First Circuit decision, exhibits a serious misapprehension

of the standards applicable to justification of a credentialism require-

ment. The plaintiffs attacked civil service policies concerning employment of policemen in Massachusetts. 0 Among th6 practices questioned was a requirement that the applicant possess a high school diploma. Since the case was brought under sections 1981 and 1983,
prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the court was not compelled to adhere to the rigors of the EEOC guidelines. 81 Accepting

arguendo that a high school requirement eliminated more minorities
than nonminorities, the district court turned to the justification argument. Relying on the report of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society, the district court concluded that the requirement of a

high school diploma "is obviously significantly related to job performance as a policeman." ' Apparently satisfied with this conclusion, the
court cut off further inquiry:
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Arnold v. Ballard, No. C73-478 (N.D.
9921, at 6831 (1975);
Ohio Jan. 31, 1975), reprinted in 9 CCH EmI,. PRAc. DEc.
Goodloe v. Martin Marietta Corp., No. C-2498 (D. Colo. Jan. 13, 1972), reprinted in
7 CCH Emp. Prac. Dec. 6989 (1974).
77. Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on
Job Testing, Discrimination,and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. Rv. 844,
869 (1972).
78. Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972); Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
79. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
80. 334 F. Supp. 930, 934 (D.Mass. 1971), affd, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
81. See, e.g., 459 F.2d at 737-38. Although the EEOC Guidelines were promulgated under the statutory authority of Tide VlI the extremely close parallels between
actions under Title VII and actions under sections 1981 and 1983 have led several courts
to conclude that the guidelines are applicable to actions under sections 1981 and 1983.
E.g., Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721 (D. Minn. 1972); Western Addition
Community Org. v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See cases cited note
32 supra.
82. 334 F. Supp. at 938.
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Under those circumstances it is quite irrelevant that a validation
study showing that the possession of a high school diploma...
was not made

. .

.

or that a large percentage of present-day Mas-

sachusetts or Boston policemen do not have high school diplomas,
or that the percentage of blacks who have high school diplomas is
far lower
than the percentage of whites who have that educational
83
badge.
The stance of the district court is difficult to reconcile even with
the facts upon which it relied. Although the President's Commission
did recommend recruiting on college campuses, the commission was
particularly concerned with recruiting minority personnel and recognized that educational standards could be a significant obstacle to this
goal:
"Quality" also means personnel who represent all sections of the
community that the police serve. It scarcely needs stating that a
college education does not guarantee that its recipient will be able
to deal successfully with people whose ways of thought and action
are unfamiliar to him. As this chapter has also shown, a lack of
understanding of the problems and behavior of minority groups is
common to most police departments and is a serious deterrent to
effective police work in the often turbulent neighborhoods where
those groups are segregated.

. ..

A major, and most urgent, step

in the direction of improving police-community relations is recruiting more, many more, policemen from minority groups. 84
The court overlooked perhaps the most significant statement of the
commission in this regard: "[R]ecruitment from minority groups will
be all but impossible in the immediate future if rigid higher education
entry standards are instituted for all police jobs."85 It is strange indeed
that in relying on the commission's report the district court considered
"quite irrelevant" a situation about which the commission had expressed grave concern.
In affirming the decision, the First Circuit stated simply that
"[t]hese reports and the subsequent action of the Massachusetts legislature [in instituting the degree requirements] constituted a deliberate
value judgment that professionalization of the police is a major goal in
86
our increasingly complex society.
Whether the circuit court intended "professionalization" to con83.
84.

Id. at 939.

PREsIDEN 'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
TcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FRE SOCIETY 107 (1967).

OF JuS-

85. Id. "According to a 1966 census report, 78 percent of all white males between
the ages of 20 and 24 have completed at least 4 years of high school while only 53 percent of nonwhite males have. In the 18-to-19 year age group the gap is somewhat
greater: 63 percent of white and 37 percent of nonwhite males have completed high
school." Id.
86. 459 F.2d 725, 735 (lst Cir. 1972).
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note a meaning different from "quality" as that term was employed by
the President's Commission is not clear. In any event, the court of appeals patently failed to grasp the substance of the Griggs decision. In
Griggs a vice president of the Duke Power Company had testified that
the educational requirement was instituted on the basis of the company's judgment that it would improve the overall quality of the work
force. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this evaluation as a valid
ground for maintaining the requirement because "[t]he evidence . . .
shows that employees who have not completed high school or taken
the tests have continued to perform satisfactorily and make progress
in departments for which the high school and test criteria are now
used. 8' 7 The clear import of Griggs is that "value judgments" that
have a discriminatory impact, whther "deliberate" or not, are impermissible unless they actually measure
the applicant's ability in relation
88
to the requirements of the job.
Although both the lower and appellate courts in Castro recited the
language of Griggs, the substance of the Supreme Court's decision was
largely misunderstood or ignored. The district court erred in its failure
to require statistical proof of the correlation between the credential and
job performance, while ironically relying on a report that seems to
compel a result contrary to that reached by the court. The circuit court
erroneously applied Griggs by assuming that value judgments are an
acceptable justification for criteria which have a discriminatory impact.
The value judgment that must control is the policy contained in Title
VII, which requires that an employer prove by statistically valid means
that criteria having a discriminatory impact are necessary to evaluate
the applicant for the job.
Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc.
The second credentialism case deserving scrutiny is Spurlock v.
United Airlines, Inc.,89 a Tenth Circuit decision. The educational requirement at issue in Spurlock was a college degree, which perhaps explains the court's leniency; greater reluctance on the part of courts to
set aside the educational criterion might be expected when it consists
of a college degree rather than a high school diploma. Nevertheless,
removal of college degree requirements where they do not actually predict job performance seems legally mandated if the principles of Title
VII are carefully analyzed and applied. 0 As one commentator noted:
87. 401 U.S. at 431-32.
88. Id. at 432.

89.

475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).

90. "It is -likewise a violation of Title VII, absent a showing of business necessity,
to require blacks, as a condition of being accepted into the company's management
training program, to possess a college degree when such educational requirement, while
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The reluctance of courts to tamper with such requirements is understandable, given the faith that American society has always reposed in education. But it ignores the substantial discriminatory
impact which educational requirements can have, without justification, on minority group employment. 91
In Spurlock the plaintiff had applied for employment as a flight
officer with United Airlines. He had previously accumulatd 204 hours
of flight time and had completed two years of college. According to
employment information circulated by United, he met the minimum job
qualifications.9" The company had, however, raised its requirements
between the time that the plaintiff obtained the information and the
time that his application was filed. An internal company memorandum
set forth the new employment policy:
In view of the current status-with approximately 189 flight officer applicants in process-we suggest the following guide lines be
used in placing candidates into process. (1) College degree; (2)
500 hours of flight time (minimum);
(3) Commercial license and
93
instrument rating; (4) Age 21 to 29.
The plaintiff reapplied prior to filing suit, having reached the required
five hundred hours of flight time; the only deficiency in his qualifications was lack of a college degree. 94 The plaintiff experienced little
difficulty in establishing the discriminatory impact of the requirement. 95
The court then turned to the question of justification for the criterion.
Several aspects of United's argument, accepted unquestioningly by the
Court, are nonetheless quite suspect.
The company presented statistics relating to the flight time requirements and the Appellate Court concluded that "[tihe statistics
clearly showed that 500 hours was a reasonable minimum to require
of applicants to insure their ability to pass United's training program." 96
neutral on its face, tends to result in the disproportionate rejection or disqualification
of otherwise qualified black applicants for this program." United States v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., No. CIV72-445 (D. Okla. Dec. 27, 1973), reprinted in 7 CCH
Emp. Prac. Dec. 6461, 6498 (1974).
91. Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1143 (1971).
92. 330 F. Supp. 228, 229 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
93. 330 F. Supp. at 229.
94. See id. at 230.
95. The plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing that United processed
only nine black flight officers out of a total of 5,900. Cf. id. at 231.
96. 475 F.2d at 218-19. The following graph was the primary evidence submitted
by United (with the statistical explanation by the court):
'The statistics presented were for the period February 1965 through April
1967 and were based on United's experience with approximately 1300 trainees,
82 of whom did not complete the training program. The statistics produced
the following results:
No. of Hours
No. of Trainees
No. of Failures
Failure Rate
200 or less
352
32
9%
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For the college degree requirement, however, no statistical studies
were introduced. 97 In lieu of statistics the court accepted the testimony
of United officials "that the possession of a college degree indicated
that the applicant had the ability to understand and retain concepts and
information given in the atmosphere of a classroom or training program.""5 It seems obvious that this testimony, unsubstantiated by significant statistical evidence, does not suffice to justify discriminatory
policies. Nevertheless, even were a statistical correlation established

between the successful completion of United's training program and
possession of a college degree, the criterion chosen seems erroneous.

The relevant criterion would seem to be job performance rather than
completion of the training program. The court neglected any discussion of a correlation between a college degree and safety records, su-

pervisors' evaluations, or even scores within the training program.
The court also neglected to consider alternative correlation procedures. In this light, for a correlation to have significance, it must
be contrasted with alternative correlations. For example, four years
of college might be compared to a two year program; even if a college
degree correlated with completion of the training program, further statistical analysis would be required to conclude that two years of college
are not equally correlated to success in the training program. From

the statistics reprinted in the circuit court opinion, it appears that flight
time was the only significant presage of success in the training program.9 9 United virtually conceded as much at trial:
201 to 500
128
19
14%
501 to 1000
154
12
8%
1001 to 1500
175
9
5%
1501 to 2000
168
3
2%
2001 to 2500
119
2
2%
2501 to 3000
89
3
2%
3001 to 5000
118
2
2%"
Id. at 219 n.1. One commentator has suggested that even for flight time this showing
is not statisically significant. Note, Employment Discrimination-Building Up the
Headwinds, 52 N.C.L. Rnv. 181, 186 (1973).
97. The district court referred to studies made by United relating to college degrees. 330 F. Supp. at 235. This reference, however, seems to have confused the statistical studies made in regard to flight time with the United official's testimony that a
college degree was an indication of ability to retain concepts.
98. 475 F.2d at 219. For an interesting analysis demonstrating how misleading
such unsubstantiated "indications" can be, see Making It in College Without a High
School Diploma, 96 Mo. LAB. REv. 45 (July, 1973). In fact, however, it seems clear
from United's internal memorandum that the purpose in increasing the educational requirements was not to increase trainability, but to limit the number of applicants.
99. 475 F.2d at 219. A careful analysis of the statistics utilized by the court with
regard to the correlation of flight hours to successful completion of the training program
indicates that the correlation exists regardless of credential attainment. Since the statistics were for the period February 1965 through April 1967, much before the company
raised its education requirement from two to four years of college in April 1969, it is
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United admits that this college requirement is the least important
of its qualifications and that the degree requirement is occasionally waived when the more important qualification of flight time
is particularly good. 10 0
Ironically, on two other occasions, United waived the flight time requirement in favor of white applicants.' 0 ' Since plaintiff had the relevant qualifications, the degree requirement should not have precluded
his entry into the training program. 0 2
Taken as a whole, Castro and Spurlock seem weak authority for
courts entertaining future credentialism suits. Although the occupations-policemen and airline pilots-involved in the two cases might
conceivably fall within an "exceptional" category, the evidence presented in those cases fell far short of establishing any such exception.
Once a discriminatory impact is found to exist, courts must scrutinize
the "meaningful study" presented as proof of the validity of the criteria
to insure that it is in fact what is purports to be. Nonstatistical studies
are of doubtful value. If in fact a statistical correlation is established
between the requirement and the elements of the job, alternatives must
be considered. In virtually every instance, a specific, criterion-referenced test will predict work performance better, with a less discriminatory impact. Educational credentials should enjoy no more deference
than general intelligence examinations, which have been regularly
struck down as employment criteria' 0 3 in favor of tests10 4that "measure
the person for the job and not the person in the abstract."'
Remedies Under Title VII
The foregoing discussion has attempted to demonstrate that a
plaintiff in a Title VII suit should have little trouble establishing
evident that even if the correlation of flight time with success in the training program
is statistically significant, it is unaffected by the fact that the company hired noncollege
graduates. See note 96 supra.
100. 330 F. Supp. at 235.
101. Id. at 231.

102. Cf. BmR, supra note 22, at 153: "In none of the Air Force's studies does educational achievement account for more than a marginal portion of the substantial variations observed in the performance of very sizeable numbers of airmen who have completed a large number of the most diversified courses."
103. E.g., United States v. Georga Power Co.. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973);
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard

Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
104.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). Particularly troubling

is the situation in which both testing and educational credential requirements are attacked, but the court chooses to deal only with the tests. The fact that one requirement
is found to be discriminatory hardly relieves the court of the obligation to investigate
other potentially discriminatory criteria properly before the court. The court in Com-

monwealth v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724, 730 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1974), however, appears
to have concluded otherwise.

May 1975]

May 19751

t2REDENTIALISM
RDNIUM39

1399

a prima facie case of discriminatory impact on minorities ensuing from
the use of educational credentials as employment criteria, and that an
employer should encounter substantial difficulty in justifying credentialism under most circumstances if Title VII principles are properly
applied. Assuming that the employer is found to have violated the act,
the question of the appropriate remedy in a Title VII credentialism case
remains. Although a detailed discussion of remedies is beyond the
scope of this article, 10 5 those remedies applicable to the special problems of credentialism will be briefly explored.
Injunctive Relief
Clearly the most simple and effective remedy for the discriminatory use of educational credentials is their elimination. Unlike a single
exam that has a discriminatory impact, a credential requirement is difficult to modify into a evaluative criterion related to the skills actually
required for the job. Owing to the nature of credentialism, an injunction is the only practicable first step in rectifying the harmful consequences of the practice. The Fifth Circuit has recently maintained its
strong stance against such discriminatory practices, holding that a lower
court's failure to enjoin a credential requirement was reversible
error.°71 6 Citing the major decisions in the circuit, Georgia Power
Co.,1 Johnson v. Goodyear,08 and Pettway, 0 9 the court stated,
In the fast moving world of Title VII law, important decisions of
this court have supervened the decision of the district court ....
These decisions make it clear that the district court should have
enjoined the use of the education requirement."lo
Financial Redress
In addition, whether the educational credential is a barrier to employment or to promotion, those persons unfairly denied access to the
desired job suffer financial loss. Any remedial decree, in addition to
enjoining the discriminatory practice, must therefore award monetary
compensation to those discriminated against. Title VII specifically
contemplates grants of back pay in discrimination cases"' and the
105. See generally McDonald, Remedies for Racial Violations, LABOR LAw DE.
VELOPmEBNTs 1 (1974); Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 741 (1973); Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Employment DiscriminationCases, 27 ARK.L. REv. 603 (1973).
106. Duhon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 494 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1974).
107. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
108. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
109. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
110. 494 F.2d 817, 819 (5th Cir. 1974).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp.Ill, 1973) provides that the court may order
"such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but isnot limited
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courts 'have generally been receptive to such relief. As one court has
said,
Because of the compensatory nature of a back pay award and the
strong congressional policy embodied in Title VII . . . a plaintiff
or a complaining class who is successful in obtaining an injunction
under Title VII of the Act should ordinarly be awarded back pay
112
unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.
Moreover, unlike testing procedures which have a discriminatory
impact only after the applicant has applied for the job and taken the
test, educational credentials are self-excluding. If a minority individual
knows that a particular company's hiring procedure requires a degree
that he does not have, his course of action may be determined by the discriminatory impact of the credential requirement. As the EEOC has
observed, "[W]itness testimony establishes that Negroes often are deterred from bidding on a job because of stated high school education
11 3
requirements.
Some courts have already grappled with this problem. It appears
that notwithstanding the difficulties of identification, if a plaintiff is able
to certify such a class of nonapplicants, it will be as eligible as a class
of rejected applicants for back pay consideration." 4 In view of the
self-excluding nature of a credential requirement, it is important that
the courts thus take cognizance of plaintiffs who have not applied for
jobs because of credentialism. Increasing the class of plaintiffs to include those who were deterred from applying has the salutary effect
of both reimbursing persons who have actually been discriminated
against, and further encouraging voluntary curtailment of the widespread practice of credentialism 1 5
Financing the Litigation
Finally, since Title VII cases are ordinarily brought by those who
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be responsible for
the unlawful employment practice) .... ." Back pay liability against states is precluded, however, by the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
112. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973).
113. EEOC Decision No. 75-047 (Oct. 21, 1974), reprinted in 9 CCH EMp. PRAc.
DEc. 6441, at 4172 (1974).
114. Compare Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., No. 71H301 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 14, 1972), reprinted in 7 CCH Emp. Prac. Dec. 7432 (1972), with EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., Nos. 74-1007 to -1009, -1675 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 1975), reprinted in
10 BNA FAr EM,. PRAc. CAs. 239, 246 (1975); see Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 753-54 (1973).
115. "I firmly believe that the real incentive or catalyst for compliance with Title
VII laws in employment will be the potential liability for large damage awards." McDonald, Remedies for Racial Violations, IABOR LAw DEVELOPMENTs 1, 26 (1974).
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have been deprived of employment in some fashion, financing an action
against the employer might well be an impossible burden. In an effort
to mitigate the financial burden, Congress has provided explicit authority for an award of attorneys' fees." 6 Interpreting the statute, the First
Circuit Court7 of Appeals noted in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.:"1
This court as part of its obligation "to make sure that Title VII
works," has liberally applied the attorney's fees provision of Title
VII, recognizing the importance of private enforcement of civil
rights legislation."18
The statutory provision for attorneys' fees also allows special interest foundations to finance anticredentialism actions, with a reasonable expectation of eventual reimbursement. The "revolving fund"
concept has been used successfullly by the NAACP and the private bar
through the Lawyers Committee and can be of great assistance in attacking credentialism. 1" 9
Conclusion
This article has focused primarily on the disadvantages faced by
minorities as the group of last entry into a work force governed in large
part by credential requirements. Although prospective minority employees are the primary beneficiaries of an attack on credentialism via
Title VII, society in general is also likely to benefit. If employers are
prohibited from using credential requirements as employment criteria,
many of the collateral ill effects traceable to credentialism can be severely curtailed or eliminated. Both minority and nonminority individuals who apply for employment may be confident that the only criteria
legally available to determine their eligibility will be those which measure individual abilities in relation to the skills required for the job, not
whether one has endured to completion the formal educational system. Evidence of such competency will not be limited to a paper
proof that contrains options for development of personal potential. The
educational system, at least to some greater degree will be free to concentrate on those cognitive skills that have traditionally been its respon116. "In any action or proceeding under this title, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .... "
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970), as amended (Supp. lII, 1973); see Falcon, Award of
Attorneys, Fees in Civil Rights and ConstitutionalLitigation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379, 396411 (1973); Nussbaum, Attorneys' Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv.
301 (1973); Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Litigation Where the Action Is Not Based on a Statute Providing for an Award of Attorney Fees, 41 U. CuWN.
I. REV. 405 (1972).
117. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
118. Id. at 716; accord, Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974).
119. Maslow, Is Title VII Sinking?, 4 JtURIS DocToR 28, 29-30 (Sept. 1974).
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sibility; new organizational arrangements can be devised for those nonacademic activities important to movement into adulthood and the work
force. 120 Finally, employers will be forced to -rationalize their hiring
procedures. A hiring system based on individual ability and merit,
fairly and honestly measured, can only improve productivity and employee satisfaction. The arbitrary placement of employees on the basis
of credentials, compounded by the failure to distinguish between those
credentials produced by superior ability and those garnered through
sheer financial staying ability, can be replaced with relevant rational,
criterion-referenced approaches to the hiring process.
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